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And even as we, who are now in Space, look down on Flatland and
see the insides of all things, so of a certainty there is yet above us some
higher, purer region, whither though dost surely purpose to lead me
O my Priest, Philosopher, and Friend some yet more spacious Space,
some more dimensionable Dimensionality, from the vantage-ground
of which we shall look down together upon the revealed insides of
Solid things, and where thine own intestines, and those of thy kindred
Spheres, will lie exposed to the view of the poor wandering exile from
Flatland, to whom so much has already been vouchsafed. (Abbott
1952, 88)
Could the three-dimensionality of the world be an illusion? That is,
could the world appear to have a di¤erent number of spatial dimensions than
it actually has? If the question concerns mere possibility, then the answer is
clearly yes there are many ways this might be. The most straightforward,
perhaps, is the scenario explored in Flatland (Abbott 1952). Consider a race
of creatures whose movements and sensory experiences are conned to a plane
within a three-dimensional world. Such a world appears to its inhabitants
to be two-dimensional. However, the illusory nature of this appearance can
be revealed to them by interaction with an ordinary three-dimensional being
like us, via such phenomena as appearing from nowherewithin a locked
room, or describing the current state of a Flatlanders intestines. Similarly,
we can imagine a race of creatures whose movements and sensory experiences
are conned to a three-dimensional space within a four-dimensional world.
Such a world appears to its inhabitants to be three-dimensional, and again
the illusory nature of this appearance could be revealed by interaction with
four-dimensional beings via the kinds of phenomena just mentioned.
1
So the three-dimensionality of the world could be an illusion. But is
there any reason to think that it is an illusion? Certainly creatures dont
materialize inside locked rooms, and if there are beings who can describe the
current state of our intestines to us, they dont do so by hovering over us
in a fourth dimension (unfortunately). However, modern physics has led to
various kinds of claim that the dimensionality of the world is greater than
three. First, special relativity arguably entails that the time dimension is not
distinct from the three spatial dimensions, and hence that the world is four-
dimensional. While there are interesting questions here about the sense in
which the time dimension can be treated as spacelike, I restrict attention
for present purposes to spatial dimensions, excluding time. Second, string
theory postulates that there are nine (or perhaps ten) spatial dimensions, but
that all but three are curled upso small that they are irrelevant to our ex-
perience. A case might be made that in such a case the three-dimensionality
of the world is an illusion, but since there is no direct evidence for string the-
ory, I set this possibility aside as speculation. Finally, quantum mechanics
represents the state of the world via a 3N -dimensional wavefunction, where
N is the number of particles in the universe. Quantum mechanics is not just
speculation; it is a well-conrmed theory. So perhaps there really is evidence
that the three-dimensionality of the world is illusory. But to see whether
this surprising conclusion it is warranted, we rst need to understand why
quantum mechanics requires a 3N -dimensional wavefunction.
1 The wavefunction
Consider a very simple world, consisting of just two particles moving around
in three-dimensional space. We can pick an origin and three mutually orthog-
onal directions, and hence impose a coordinate system on the space; the state
of the world at a time can then be represented as two points in this space,
say (1; 4; 3) and (9; 2; 6). Alternatively, we can represent the same state as
a single point in a six-dimensional space, namely (1; 4; 3; 9; 2; 6). The latter
is called a conguration space representation, since each point in the space
represents a conguration of particles in ordinary three-dimensional space.
Pretty clearly, the two representations are equivalent any arrangement of
particles in three-dimensional space corresponds to a point in conguration
space, and conversely any point in conguration space corresponds to an
arrangement of particles in three-dimensional space.
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Figure 1: Field intensity in 3D space
Now suppose that, instead of particles, our toy world contains two elds
continuous distributions of some quantity over three-dimensional space, rather
than discrete particles. That is, the three-dimensional space contains two
objects a function f1(x; y; z) and a second function f2(x; y; z), each repre-
senting the intensity of its respective eld as a function of the three spatial
coordinates. Again, we can represent the same state in a six-dimensional
space as a function F (x1; y1; z1; x2; y2; z2), where the rst three coordinates
are those of the eld f1 and the second three are those of f2. For example,
suppose eld f1 has non-zero intensity only in two regions A and B, and f2
has non-zero intensity only in two regions C and D, as shown (schematically)
in Fig. 1. Here the horizontal axis represents the three spatial dimensions,
reduced to one for ease of representation.
Alternatively, we can choose to represent the state of the system in the
six-dimensional space shown (schematically) in Fig. 2(a). Here the horizontal
axis represents the coordinates of f1, the vertical axis represents the coordi-
nates of f2, and the shaded areas represent non-zero eld intensity. In the f1
coordinates, the eld has non-zero intensity only in regions A and B, and in
the f2 coordinates, the eld has non-zero intensity only in regions C and D,
as in the three-dimensional representation. But note that exactly the same
is true of the eld distributions shown in Fig. 2(b) and 2(c). That is, any
one of these six-dimensional eld distributions (and many others besides) can
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Figure 2: Field intensity in 6D space
adequately represent the three-dimensional eld distribution of Fig. 1.
So any two elds in three-dimensional space can be represented by a eld
in six-dimensional space and in fact there is considerable freedom in choos-
ing the latter, since many such representations contain all the information
in the three-dimensional representation. But by the same token, a eld in a
six-dimensional space cannot in general be represented without loss as two
elds in three-dimensional space, since the six-dimensional eld contains in-
formation that is not present in the corresponding pair of three-dimensional
elds. This is reected in the fact that the distinct six-dimensional elds of
Figs. 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) correspond to one and the same three-dimensional
representation that of Fig. 1.
In quantum mechanics, the state of a system of N particles can be ex-
pressed a function of 3N coordinates, 3 for each particle. This is the wave-
function, written  (x1; y1; z1; : : : xN ; yN ; zN). As this expression suggests, the
wavefunction is most naturally represented in a 3N -dimensional space; in fact
the wavefunction cannot be expressed as a set ofN elds in three-dimensional
space, because the empirical predictions of the theory depend on the infor-
mation that is lost in the three-dimensional representation. For example, for
a two-particle system, the three wavefunctions depicted in Figs. 2(a), 2(b)
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and 2(c) would result in di¤erent predictions for the measured positions of
the particles; Fig. 2(c) represents a state in which particle 2 is at C if and
only if particle 1 is at A, Fig. 2(b) represents a state in which particle 2 is at
C if and only if particle 1 is at B, and Fig. 2(a) represents a state in which
there is no such correlation between the locations of the particles.
The foundations of quantum mechanics are notoriously contested, and
the status of the wavefunction is no exception. But there is a prima facie
case, at least, that the wavefunction should be regarded as the fundamental
entity of quantum mechanics. It is the evolution of the wavefunction that is
governed by the basic dynamical law of the theory, and it is the wavefunction
at the end of an experiment that generates its empirical predictions. As J. S.
Bell famously put it, No one can understand this theory until he is willing
to think of  as a real objective eld . . . Even though it propagates not
in 3-space but in 3N -space (1987, 128). That is, realism in the context
of quantum mechanics arguably commits you to the existence of an entity
corresponding to the wavefunction of the world a 3N -dimensional eld,
where N is the total number of particles in the universe. This is a radical
violation of the intuition that there are three spatial dimensions it is not
that there are four, or ten, but that there are at least 1080 spatial dimensions.
2 Keeping up appearances
So why does it look to us as if there are three spatial dimensions, if in fact
there are not? David Albert (1996) suggests that the answer lies in the
dynamical law by which the quantum state evolves; an element of the dy-
namical law called the Hamiltonian takes a particularly simple form if the
3N spatial coordinates are grouped into N sets of 3 (rather than 3N=2 sets
of 2, or 3N=4 sets of 4, etc.). The Hamiltonian is a representation of the
energy properties of a physical system. In classical physics it is a function
from the positions and momenta of the particles in the system to a real num-
ber representing the total energy of the system kinetic energy plus poten-
tial energy. The use of the Hamiltonian in classical mechanics is somewhat
arcane its not the high school version of the theory but it allows for a
particularly succinct expression of the dynamical laws by which the state of
the system evolves over time. In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, the
Hamiltonian formulation of the theory is the canonical one. Properties are
represented as operators rather than functions in quantum mechanics; the
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Hamiltonian is a di¤erential operator acting on the wavefunction. But as in
classical mechanics, the Hamiltonian acting on a wavefunction represents the
energy properties of the system with that wavefunction, and as in classical
mechanics, this representation allows for a very succinct expression of the
dynamical law by which the wavefunction evolves. This dynamical law the
Schrödinger equation says that (up to a constant) the rate of change of the
wavefunction is equal to the result of applying the Hamiltonian operator to
the wavefunction. In brief, for both classical and quantum mechanics, the
Hamiltonian tells you how the total energy varies across possible states of
a system, and plays a key role in one formulation of the dynamics for the
system.
With this understanding of the Hamiltonian in mind, let us return to Al-
berts argument. Note rst that there is a sense in which classical behavior
emerges from quantum mechanical behavior in the macroscopic limit that
is, as systems become large and complicated. The sense is that while micro-
scopic systems must typically be represented by a spread-out wavefunction
in conguration space, macroscopic systems can always be represented to
a good degree of approximation by a point in conguration space. And a
point in 3N-dimensional conguration space, as shown above, can equally
well be represented as N points in three-dimensional space. Of course, it can
also be represented as 3N=2 points in a two-dimensional space, and so on.
But if we choose to group the coordinates into threes, then the Hamiltonian
takes a particularly neat form; the potential energy term depends only on
the distances between the N particles. On the other hand, if we choose to
group the coordinates into two or fours or sevens, then the potential energy
term will bear no straightforward relation to the interparticledistances so
produced.
The key point is that the form of the Hamiltonian one obtains by group-
ing into threes corresponds to our classical world-view; potential energy, be it
gravitational, electrostatic or some other, is taken to be generated by forces
that depend only on the distances between the objects involved. Indeed,
elementary classical mechanics takes these interparticle force laws (e.g. the
inverse-square laws of gravitation and electrostatics) to be fundamental, and
the Hamiltonian (if one thinks of it at all) is taken to be a construction based
on these fundamental laws. If Albert is right we have to give up this picture,
since there are no particles moving in three-dimensional space and hence no
laws governing their motion; it is the wavefunction and Hamiltonian in 3N
dimensions that are fundamental. But his claim is that we can nevertheless
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explain why our intuitive picture of the world has three dimensions, since it
is the obvious (though false) interpretation of the behavior of macroscopic
objects. That is, even though there is nothing in fundamental reality cor-
responding to our choice of coordinate grouping, if we choose to group the
coordinates in threes a particular description of the behavior of medium-sized
everyday objects becomes available to us, namely the classical description of
objects moving in three-dimensional space, subject to forces that depend on
the distances between them. Hence quantum-mechanical worlds are going
to appear (falsely!) to their inhabitants, if they dont look too closely, to
have the same number of spatial dimensions as their classical counterparts
do, namely three (Albert 1996, 282). The reason for the caveat, of course, is
that if we do look closely if we perform experiments that reveal the under-
lying quantum-mechanical nature of microscopic reality then we convince
ourselves that the world cant really be three-dimensional via the arguments
of the previous section.
If Albert is right, then the world is really 3N -dimensional, yet appears
three-dimensional to us. But is he right? There are reasons to be skeptical
(Monton 2002; Lewis 2004). First, note that the above story about group-
ing the coordinates into threes is somewhat simplied; more is required to
recover the coordinate system in which the Hamiltonian takes the familiar
three-dimensional form. Consider a classical two-particle system, represented
by a point in a six-dimensional space. The choice of origin and the order in
which we list the coordinates is conventional; we can choose any system we
like. But starting from such a coordinate system, we cannot recover the
three-dimensional coordinates in which the standard force laws hold simply
by grouping the coordinates into threes. First, we have to make sure that the
axes line up that the two x-axes, for example, point in the samedirection.
Second, we have to make sure that the coordinates are ordered in the right
way, such that the rst and fourth are the x-coordinates of the (ctional)
particles, the second and fth are the y-coordinates, and the third and sixth
are the z-coordinates. Finally, we have to make sure that the origins for
the two x-coordinates coincide, and similarly for the y- and z-coordinates.
Note all the scare quotes here. The two x-axes cant really point in the same
direction, since they are orthogonal in conguration space, but nevertheless
one particular relative orientation is required for the Hamiltonian to take
the right form. Similarly for the ordering and the origin; no coordinates are
really x-coordinates, so the origins of the two x-coordinates cannot really co-
incide. If there isnt really a three-dimensional space, it seems that theres no
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explanation for these requirements other than that they work to produce the
familiar Hamiltonian. Indeed, one might start to suspect that requirements
like this are part of what it takes for a space to be three-dimensional.
On a related note, our picture of force laws in three dimensions is more
than just an expendable intuition; it is the explanation of the form of the
Hamiltonian. It is not just high school physics that takes force laws between
three-dimensional objects as fundamental; when quantum mechanics is ap-
plied to a physical system, the potential energy term in the Hamiltonian is
constructed by appeal to such laws. Under Alberts way of looking at things,
we would have to forego this explanation of what we are doing. Albert is free
to postulate that the Hamiltonian is unexplained and fundamental, but then
it becomes mysterious why the method of constructing the Hamiltonian from
the three-dimensional conguration of our system works at all.
Finally, although grouping the coordinates into threes yields a particularly
simple Hamiltonian, this simplicity cannot be parlayed into an explanation of
three-dimensional appearances. It is true that a particular choice of coordi-
nates sometimes plays a role in the explanation of appearances. For example,
I might choose coordinates in which my o¢ ce is at rest (rather than ones in
which the sun is at rest) in order to explain my experience of thunderclouds
building behind the skyscrapers of downtown Miami. But the dependence of
the explanation on the choice of coordinates here is supercial; it is simply a
matter of calculational convenience. Even if I used the sun-centered coordi-
nates, it would still be the case that the clouds, the buildings and my o¢ ce
lie in a straight line. The coordinate-dependence in Alberts account is much
more thoroughgoing to an extent that makes it problematic. For one thing,
three points that lie on a straight line under one grouping of 3N -dimensional
coordinates will not, in general, lie in a straight line under another grouping.
For another, the patterns of points that we identify as buildings and clouds
will not, in general, be present under another grouping. But patterns that
appear only under one arbitrary choice of coordinates are generally regarded
as artifacts of that choice rather than facts about the world, since the facts
about the world presumably dont depend on our representational choices. If
there are no buildings and clouds and o¢ ces that lie in a straight line, then
the explanation of my experience evaporates.
But now we seem to have painted ourselves into a corner. The state
of a quantum mechanical system cant be represented without loss in three
dimensions; it has to be represented in a 3N -dimensional conguration space.
But the evolution of the wavefunction in 3N dimensions cant explain our
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three-dimensional appearances. So either quantum mechanics is wrong, or
we are radically deceived about the nature of our own experience. Neither
of these looks like an attractive option.
3 Conguration space
But all is not lost, since there is another option available to us namely
that we are wrong about the structure of space. A rather atfooted solution
along these lines would be to propose that there are in fact two spaces
the 3N -dimensional space in which the wavefunction evolves, and the three-
dimensional space in which the objects of our experience move around
neither of which can be reduced to the other. But this proposal introduces
as many problems as it solves; how does the motion of the wavefunction
in one space give rise to the motion of objects in a completely separate
space (Monton 2006)? A more subtle solution is that the three-dimensional
structure is already present in the conguration space. Thus far, we have
been treating the space in which the wavefunction evolves as 3N -dimensional
in the same sense that ordinary space is three-dimensional essentially, as
a space spanned by 3N mutually orthogonal vectors and having no other
structure. But perhaps theres more to conguration space than initially
meets the eye.
Consider ordinary three-dimensional space. To impose coordinates on this
space, you choose an origin, a length scale, and three mutually orthogonal
axes. We have been supposing thus far that the coordinatization of cong-
uration space is just like this; to impose coordinates on a 3N -dimensional
conguration space, you choose an origin, a length scale, and 3N mutually
orthogonal axes. It is precisely this freedom in choosing coordinates that
leads to the problems facing Alberts argument, since most such choices do
not yield the simple Hamiltonian or the objects of ordinary experience.
But suppose instead that we take seriously the idea of a conguration
space as a space of congurations that is, a space which is intrinsically
structured as N sets of three-dimensional coordinates. Mathematically, this
is not hard to do. Instead of modeling the space as an ordered 3N -tuple of
parameters, hx1; x2; : : : ; x3Ni, we model it as an ordered N -tuple of ordered
triples:
hhx1; y1; z1i ; hx2; y2; z2i ; : : : ; hxN ; yN ; zNii :
And rather than specifying the coordinates by choosing 3N axes, we choose
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3 the x, y and z axis, which are the same for each triple. That is, x1 through
xN pick out points on the same axis, and similarly for y and z. Then the
wavefunction can be regarded as a function of these parameters as a math-
ematical entity inhabiting a (3N)-dimensional conguration space, rather
than a 3N -dimensional plain space. And the basic thesis of wavefunction
realism is that the world has this structure the structure of a function on
(3N)-dimensional conguration space.
Given that conguration space has this structure, then an Albert-style
appeal to dynamics to generate three-dimensional appearance is impossi-
ble, but it is also unnecessary. It is impossible because the Hamiltonian
takes exactly the same form under every choice of coordinates, so no choice
makes it especially simple. But it is unnecessary because the outcome of
that argument that the coordinates are naturally grouped into threes is
built into the structure of reality, and hence doesnt need to be generated as
a mere appearance based on the simplicity of the dynamics.
4 Dimension without illusion
The proposal of the previous section is designed to allow us to say that
the world of quantum mechanics really is three-dimensional, and hence the
three-dimensionality of appearances doesnt have to be generated as any
kind of illusion. Our appearances are veridical. But does the proposal really
allow us to do that? The wavefunction is still a function of 3N independent
parameters, even if those parameters have some internal structure. Isnt that
a prima facie reason to say that the wavefunction and hence the world is
3N -dimensional?
Previously, I took the lesson here to be that the term dimension is
ambiguous in the quantum-mechanical world (Lewis 2004). One can take it
to refer to the number of independent parameters required to specify a point
in the space in which the quantum state evolves, or one can take it to refer
to the number of independent axes required to impose coordinates on the
space. In the classical case, these two coincide; a point in the space in which
the classical state evolves is specied by three parameters, and imposing
coordinates on the space requires three axes. But in the quantum case, the
two dimension concepts come apart; it takes 3N parameters to specify a
point in the space in which the wavefunction evolves, but only three axes are
required to impose coordinates on this space. Hence if quantum mechanics
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is true, there is a sense in which the world is 3N -dimensional and a sense in
which it is three-dimensional. It is the latter sense under which the world
truly appears three-dimensional.
My 2004 position is essentially the same as the one Albert adopts in the
coda to his 1996 paper (although our reasons for adopting the position are
di¤erent). Here Albert restates his thesis a bit more diplomatically(1996,
282). The diplomatic version of his thesis is that there are two ideas were
accustomed to having in mind when we think of physical space. The rst
is the space of possible interactive distances that is, the space in which
the distances between points are the interparticle distancesappearing in
the Hamiltonian. This space is three-dimensional the dynamical laws are
laws of a three-dimensional world. The second is the space in which a
specication of the local conditions at every address at some particular time
(but not at any proper subset of them) amounts to a complete specica-
tion of the physical situation of the world, on that theory, at that time.
This space is 3N -dimensional; it takes a specication of the wavefunction
amplitude at every point in a 3N -dimensional space to completely specify
the quantum state of the world. So, diplomatically speaking, it is not that
the three-dimensionality of the world is an illusion; rather, the world re-
ally is three-dimensional under one reading of dimension, and it really is
3N -dimensional under the other reading.
This position still seems tenable to me, but there is an alternative position
that I now nd more attractive. Albert initially claimed that the world is 3N -
dimensional, and the appearance that the world is three-dimensional (when
we dont look too closely) is illusory. Later he claimed (and I concurred) that
the three-dimensional appearances (when we dont look closely) and the 3N -
dimensional appearances (when we do) can both be taken as veridical, since
dimensionis ambiguous. However, there is a third possibility namely that
the world is three-dimensional, and the 3N -dimensional appearance of the
world when we look closely is illusory. That is, our everyday impression that
the world is three-dimensional is correct, but the impression we get from
our quantum-mechanical experiments that the world is 3N -dimensional is
misleading. This third position seems to have something to be said for it,
and in what follows I explore and defend it.
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5 Dimensions and parameters
The claim that the quantum world is 3N -dimensional is based on the fact
that the wavefunction is a function of 3N independent parameters. This is
a perfectly good characterization of dimension in some general sense of
the concept. But the number of independent parameters is not always a
good way to characterize the spatial dimensionality of a system. Sometimes
a parameter is not a spatial parameter at all. For example, in evolutionary
game theory, the state of a population of organisms can be represented as
a function of n parameters, one for each organism, where each parameter
represents the continuum of possible strategies the organism can adopt in
interacting with the others, and the function represents the probability dis-
tribution over the strategy space i.e. the chance that organisms will use
particular strategies in their interactions with each other. Clearly nothing
should be inferred from this model about the (literal, rather than gurative)
space in which the organisms live.
But of course in the quantum case the parameters are spatial; each is
a position coordinate for a particle. Still, it doesnt follow that the repre-
sentation is of a spatially 3N -dimensional world. Consider again the case of
evolutionary game theory. Insofar as such a model is intended to be real-
istic, it is intended to be about n individual organisms, each with its own
probability distribution for adopting a particular strategy. But there may
be information in the full n-dimensional representation that is lost when the
population is represented as n single-organism states. We can reinterpret
Figs. 1 and 2 to demonstrate this. Suppose Fig. 1 represents the strategy
distributions for two organisms; organism 1 adopts strategies of type A and
type B with equal probabilities, and organism 2 adopts strategies C and D
with equal probabilities. But the single-organism properties of Fig. 1 are
compatible with each of the three n-organism states represented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2(a) represents a state in which the strategy adopted by each organ-
ism is independent of that adopted by the other organism, and Figs. 2(b)
and 2(c) represent states in which the strategy adopted by each organism
depends on what the other does. Clearly the future evolution of the system
depends on which n-organism state the population has. But this wouldnt
warrant the inference that reality consists of an n-organism entity rather than
n individual organisms. The organisms just happen to have complicated con-
ditional properties; their strategies depend on those of the organisms with
which they interact. The most convenient way to represent these conditional
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properties perhaps the only convenient way is via the n-dimensional state,
but nothing ontological should be read into this.
One can adopt a similar position with regard to the quantum mechanical
wavefunction. That is, the fact that the state of a quantum system can be
represented without loss as a single wavefunction in a 3N -dimensional cong-
uration space but not asN single-particle wavefunctions in three-dimensional
space does not entail that the world is spatially 3N -dimensional. Rather, one
could interpret the situation as one in which the particles have complicated
conditional connections; the position properties of one particle, as encoded
in the wavefunction, depend on those of the other particles (c.f. Monton
2012). The 3N -dimensional wavefunction may be the only convenient way
to represent these properties, but it does not follow that it literally represents
the spatial structure of the world. This is not to give up the assumption of
wavefunction realism; the structure of the wavefunction accurately reects
the structure of the world, but some of that structure consists in correlations
between spatial positions. The wavefunction is a function of 3N parameters,
but we need not interpret each parameter as an independent spatial direction.
6 Spatial phenomena
So far, I have argued that we need not interpret the quantum world as spa-
tially 3N -dimensional; we cant simply read the spatial structure of the world
o¤ the mathematical structure of our representation. But this leaves open
the question of how we should interpret the wavefunction. The question is
whether the 3N parameters of conguration space deserve to be called spatial
dimensions. And the answer, I suggest, hangs on the connections between
those parameters and spatial phenomena.
The claim that the quantum world is three-dimensional is based on a fairly
direct correspondence between the structure of conguration space and the
structure of our spatial experience. I can stick my arm out in some arbitrary
direction and stipulate that every third conguration-space parameter refers
to that direction, and similarly pick two directions orthogonal to my arm
to correspond to the remaining conguration-space parameters. Hence the
sense in which the world is three-dimensional is straightforwardly a spatial
sense. But no such direct correspondence to experience is available for the
claim that the quantum world is 3N -dimensional; if the rst and fourth
conguration space parameters are in fact orthogonal spatial directions in
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Figure 3: Mach-Zehnder interferometer
some sense, this is no part of my experience. Hence the doubt that the 3N
parameters should be characterized as spatial.
Still, an indirect correspondence to experience might be available. Con-
sider again the Flatland scenario that we started with. The two-dimensional
Flatlander suspects that he is really living in a three-dimensional world be-
cause various phenomena he observes are explicable in terms of three dimen-
sions, but not in terms of two. Similarly, various phenomena in the quantum
world are explicable on the assumption that the quantum state evolves in a
3N -dimensional space, but arguably not under the assumption that it evolves
in a three-dimensional space. Consider, for example, the Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer shown in Fig. 3(a). A single-particle wave packet (labelled 1 in
the diagram) enters the device at the bottom left and is split into two equal
wave packets by the half-silvered mirror A. The two packets are reected by
mirrors at B and C respectively, and both arrive at the second half-silvered
mirror D. If the path lengths ABD and ACD are exactly equal, then the
wave components emerging towards detector F are exactly out of phase the
troughs of one wave coincide with the peaks of the other and the two waves
exactly cancel out. By the same token, the wave components emerging to-
wards detector E are exactly in phase the peaks coincide and the troughs
14
Figure 4: Conguration space representation
coincide and the two waves add in intensity. The result is a single wave
packet, of exactly the intensity of the one input at the bottom left, emerging
towards detector E. That is, the two wave packets travelling via B and C
collide and interact at D, producing a single wave packet travelling towards
E.
Now suppose that the wave packet travelling via B interacts with a wave
packet associated with another particle (labelled 2 in the diagram), and the
wave packet travelling via C does not, as shown in Fig. 3(b). What happens
now is that the two wave packets arriving at D no longer interact, resulting in
wave packets travelling onwards towards E and F. It is as if the wave packets
pass by each other rather than colliding. Indeed, if one adopts a congura-
tion space representation, this is exactly what happens; the packet travelling
via B undergoes a shift in the coordinates of the second particle, whereas the
packet travelling via C undergoes no such shift. I have attempted a cong-
uration space representation in Fig. 4. The full conguration space has six
dimensions; I have chosen three to include in the diagram, the two horizon-
tal dimensions representing the plane of the experiment in the coordinates
of particle 1, and the vertical dimension representing one of the coordinates
of particle 2. A wave packet representing both particles enters at the bottom
left and is split in the coordinates of particle 1 by mirror A. The vertical jog
on the lower path represents the collision of the particles; particle 2 moves, so
the trajectory shifts in the coordinates of particle 2. But now the two wave
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packets dont hit the same spot in the (ve-dimensional) plane of mirror D,
since they di¤er in the coordinates of particle 2. Hence no interference occurs
at D, and each packet is again equally split into two further packets in the
coordinates of particle 1.
Here, then, we apparently have indirect evidence that the quantum world
is 3N -dimensional. The extra dimensions seem necessary to explain the
interactions, or lack of them, between wave packets. But this evidence needs
to be treated with considerable caution. Note in particular that wave packets
corresponding to di¤erent particles cannot pass by each other in the way
just described; if two wave packets corresponding to two di¤erent particles
approach the same region of three-dimensional space, then they interact.
Consider the interaction between two particles depicted in Fig. 5. Fig. 5(a)
is the ordinary three-dimensional representation; the wave packets approach
and bounce o¤ each other, and this is the case even if particle 1 or 2 interacts
with some other particle on its way to the collision point. Fig 5(b) depicts the
same interaction in conguration space, with the vertical axis representing
the x-coordinate of particle 1 and the horizontal axis the x-coordinate of
particle 2. The two-particle wave packet travels up to the diagonal line where
the coordinates of the two particles coincide, and here the trajectory suddenly
changes direction. The trajectory in conguration space acts as if it bounces
o¤ a reective wall, a wall that extends indenitely in the coordinates of any
other particles involved. But of course there is no physical wall; this behavior
is purely an expression of the dynamical laws. Pictured in conguration
space, these laws look mysterious; why should the trajectory suddenly change
direction just there? But pictured in three-dimensional space, the reason for
the sudden turn is obvious; the particles collide. The phenomena are not what
one would expect of objects moving in a 3N -dimensional space, but they are
precisely what one would expect of objects moving in a three-dimensional
space.
Of course, Albert might reply here that I have switched back to the
sense in which conguration space is three-dimensional namely that the
dynamical laws are those of a three-dimensional space. Quite right but
my contention here is precisely that the usual sense of the term spatial
is intimately connected with dynamical laws. Spatial phenomena concern
whether or not objects bounce o¤ one another or pass by one another and
these are dynamical concepts. When we are dealing with wave packets for
distinct particles, three-dimensional space, not 3N -dimensional space, is the
arena in which spatial phenomena play out. Whats more, the interactions of
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Figure 5: Interaction between two particles
ordinary macroscopic objects play out in three-dimensional space, and it is
this kind of behavior that ultimately underlies our ordinary use of the term
spatial.
Admittedly, consideration of the example with which we started this sec-
tion complicates this story. Two wave packets that are components of the
state of one and the same particle sometimes interact and sometimes pass
by each other when their three-dimensional coordinates coincide. Doesnt
this require the existence of extra dimensions in which the passing-by can
take place? Well, the lesson of the previous section is that such phenomena
dont require the existence of extra spatial dimensions. Certainly one needs
parameters in the theory, the values of which determine whether or not the
packets interact. And in the quantum case, the parameters in question refer
to the coordinates of the other particles in the system i.e. they encode
how the wave packet for the particle we are following is correlated with the
wave packets for the other particles. The question is whether we should re-
gard this structure of parameters as spatial. And we can now see clearly
the costs and benets of each answer. If we think of spatial phenomena as
3N -dimensional, we get a nice literal interpretation of the operation of the
interferometer (Fig. 4), but the behavior of everyday objects becomes mys-
terious (Fig. 5(b)). If we think of spatial phenomena as three-dimensional,
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then we can go on thinking of everyday phenomena in terms of collisions
between objects (Fig. 5(a)), but the operation of the interferometer has to
be taken as involving correlation rather than spatial location, since the spa-
tial locations dont determine the particles behavior (Fig. 3). To my eye,
the choice seems clear; the former choice does considerable violence to our
ordinary spatial notions, whereas the latter just requires a slightly less intu-
itive understanding of interference phenomena. Even in the latter case, its
not as if we cant use the 3N -dimensional representation to picture interfer-
ence to ourselves; its just that we cant take that picture as a direct spatial
representation.
7 The pragmatic dimension
The world looks three-dimensional unless one looks closely, when it looks
3N -dimensional. But which appearance is veridical, and which the illusion?
Albert initially contends that the three-dimensionality of the everyday world
is illusory, and that 3N -dimensional wavefunction one discerns in quantum
phenomena is the reality behind the illusion. What I have tried to do here is
to argue for the converse of Alberts initial position; the world really is three
dimensional, and the 3N -dimensional appearance of quantum phenomena is
the theoretical analog of an illusion; we represent quantum reality to ourselves
as 3N -dimensional in order to more readily visualize the correlations between
wave packets. The basic reason for thinking of things this way round is
that the sense in which the quantum world is three-dimensional corresponds
directly to the way we already use the term spatial, whereas the sense in
which it is 3N -dimensional does not.
Still, even if it would be a stretch to apply the adjective spatialto the
3N dimensions of conguration space, there is nothing to stop us doing so;
it would not be the rst time that ordinary usage has shifted as a result of
scientic advances. This is ultimately a pragmatic matter. But I nd it hard
to see any motivation for such a shift, since the phenomena in question are so
far removed from everyday life. We modied our concepts of rest and motion
to accommodate the idea that the Earth is moving, but doing so also gave
us the tools to better describe everyday phenomena. If a shift in our concept
of spatial dimension would reap similar benets, then no doubt such a shift
should and will occur. But until then, we can say with a straight face that
the world is three-dimensional.
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